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The conflation of immigration with terrorism in public political discourse across
post-September 11 Europe has challenged national governments to reconcile the
contradictions embedded within what hitherto had been a coherent policy equi-
librium. For most of the post-WWII period, this equilibrium was comprised of three
discrete dimensions: 1) economic: securing an adequate supply of foreign labor;
2) societal: successfully incorporating immigrants into the host societies; and 3) ex -
ternal safety: safeguarding national territorial borders. Indeed, until September 11,
Europe’s political elites could more or less assume that state decisions taken along
one of the aforementioned policy dimensions did not circumscribe decisions made
along others. However, with the inclusion of immigration in a new “security con-
tinuum” (Aradau 2001), the veracity of this premise is challenged. Specifically,
the balance of scholarly opinion has shifted from the view that Europeans are ill
informed about and/or largely deferential to the preferences of political elites on
immigration-related questions toward the conclusion that policy makers current-
ly forge immigration and immigrant policy in a super-heated political environment
within which their policy options are severely circumscribed by an attentive and
predominantly illiberal public (Bigo 2002; Karyotis 2007, 11).
Against the backdrop of this claim, this article poses and addresses two related
questions. First, has European public opinion become more illiberal on immigration-
related questions since September 11? Is it significantly less receptive to new immi -
gra tion and/or less accommodating toward settled immigrants than previously (Jennings
2005; Noelle-Neumann 2002, 95)? Second, does the opinion survey record de mon -
 s trate that European publics feel less economically, socially, and physically secure?
Have immigration-related issues become more “securitized” post-September 11?    
To address these questions, this article will go far back in the respective na tio n -
al public opinion records, paying special attention to the patterns of public atti-
tudes in Britain, France, and Spain. Why emphasize these countries? Moreover, why
conflate the aforementioned European experiences with the 9/11 U.S. tragedy? I offer
two justifications. First, the trauma of September 11, 2001, serves as a useful
proxy for the 1995 terrorist incidents in France, the July 2005 London bombings,
and the March 11, 2004, Madrid train attack. In each of these European coun-
tries a major terrorist event linked to immigration (however tangentially and/or
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rhetorically) either preceeded or followed September 11. In so doing, it potentially
prepared the groundwork for the experience of terrorism in these countries to be in -
terpreted —albeit retrospectively in the French case— by the public through the lens
of the U.S. experience. Specifically, it is often hypothesized that, for Euro peans,
September 11 has reinforced, although to varying degrees, the appropriateness of
viewing immigration-related issues through the prism of security (Guild 2003,
336; Soledad Saux 2007, 62). Second, because the events of September 11 and
their links to immigration carry a meaning for the British, French, and Spanish
publics that few other European publics can be expected to appreciate (Collyer
2006), we can reasonably assume that if public opinion on immigration-related issues
did not become more illiberal or more securitized for these publics, it is highly un -
likely that they did so among other Europeans.
Attitudes toward Immigration in Historical Perspective
On the basis of the evidence in the public opinion record, it is fair to conclude that
few policy areas have aroused greater apprehension and negativity among Western
Europeans during the past half century than immigration (Lahav 2004, 1176).
This is not to suggest that the public has always and everywhere been overtly hos-
tile to immigrants. Rather, it is simply to underscore that in contrast to other major
policy issues, public opinion is unusually consensual and negative on immigra-
tion-related matters. Since mass immigration began after WWII, relatively few
Europeans have supported it, and fewer still have embraced the social changes
that permanent mass immigrant settlement have visited upon the immigration-
receiving societies (Schain 2008a, 9).  
EARLY AND CONTINUING APPREHENSION
To be sure, post-WWII migration to Western Europe commenced under relatively
favorable economic, social, and political circumstances (Messina 2007, 52). The
first wave of labor migrants generally flowed against the backdrop of widespread
economic prosperity and popular and elite expectations that most migrants would
eventually return “home,” thus engendering the so-called “myth of return.” Partly
because of this myth, the original foreign workers were fairly well tolerated. 
The context in which the second wave of predominantly family migrants un -
folded was very different. By the mid-1970s the postwar economic boom had run
its course. Economic stagflation, high unemployment, and painful structural eco-
nomic adjustment converged to erode the generally permissive political and social
environment in which, for the most part, the first wave of foreign workers had been
received. Although economic conditions in Western Europe were better by the start
of the third wave of migration during the late 1980s, the end of the decade and the
beginning of the 1990s unfortunately coincided with a period of structural eco-
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nomic adjustment and persistently high unemployment. Compounding these dif-
ficulties were the lingering political aftershocks from the first two waves of immi-
gration. Indeed, by the time the third wave was peaking during the early 1990s,
Western European mass publics were not at all disposed to embrace it, despite
the positive economic contributions that immigrant workers continued to make
(Kuijsten 1997, 209-228).  
Even during its comparatively benign phase, however, public concern about the
fallout from mass immigrant settlement was evident across the major host countries.
In Britain, where the public opinion record is especially extensive, immigration-
related issues emerged during the 1950s as one of the most the most politically
charged areas of public policy. To illustrate: by the 1960s and 1970s more than 80 per-
cent of the public felt that too many immigrants had been admitted; moreover, in
1968, more than 25 percent identified “immigrants” as the most urgent problem
facing Britain (Messina 1989, 12-13). Indeed, so strongly did the British public resent
immigration during the late 1960s and early 1970s that a majority (56 percent) on
average agreed that immigrants should be encouraged to repatriate (Studlar 1974, 377).
Even during the late 1970s, i.e., after tens of thousands of migrants were already
long settled, 49 percent of Britons expressed the opinion that the government should
financially assist immigrants who were willing to return to their “country of origin”
(Gallup 1980, 310). Particularly ominous for long-term immigrant-native relations
were the results of seven opinion surveys conducted between 1959 and 1972, in which
on average, a plurality of respondents (42 percent) said that relations between “white
people and colored people” were “getting worse,” and 84 percent reported a “color
problem” in their district (Studlar 1974, 374). 
The British public’s dissatisfaction with mass immigration and permanent
immigrant settlement persisted throughout the early 1980s. In July 1981, a near
majority of the public (49 percent) expressed the view that Britain’s political parties
were not saying enough about immigration (Hastings and Hastings 1983, 386). In
the same month “immigrants/colored persons” were cited as “very serious social pro b -
 lems” by 56 percent of respondents, outranking other social problems including
drunkenness, pornography, heavy smoking, gambling, prostitution, and homosexuality
(Hastings and Hastings 1983, 438). A further 38 percent of respondents endorsed
repatriating immigrants as a solution to Britain’s “racial problems” (Hastings and
Hastings 1983, 444). From 1978 through 1990, either a plurality or a majority of
the public disapproved of the government’s handling of immigration in every pub-
lic opinion survey but one (King 2001, 179-180).         
How typical was the British public’s reception of early post-WWII immigration?
Although the opinion record elsewhere is less extensive, the evidence suggests
that the British experience was not unusual. In Germany, for example, 55 percent
of what researchers considered the attentive public in 1956 opposed allowing
Italian workers into the country (Noelle and Neumann 1967, 359). In 1964, a
plurality of respondents (36 percent) felt that foreign workers were a “serious
problem,” judging them to be “always after the girls” (42 percent), “loud” (39 per-
cent), “not very clean” (30 percent), and “often violent” (27 percent) (Noelle and
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Neumann 1967, 360-61). In 1975, 83 percent of Germans concurred that “foreign
workers will become a serious problem for us in the future” (Noelle-Neumann
1981, 288). Three years later, 73 percent of the public ranked the issue of foreign
workers as either “important” or “very important” (Gallup 1980, 277). Moreover,
either a majority or plurality of respondents in 1980 and 1984 endorsed the res pec -
tive statements that guest workers “should adjust their lifestyle to the German
lifestyle” (66/56 percent), “be sent home when jobs are tight” (53/41 percent), and be
barred from participating in all political activity (57/47 percent) (Hoskin 1991, 71).  
The German public’s continuing unease with post-WWII immigration and its
social fallout is perhaps best reflected in the results of two 1980s opinion surveys.
In the first (1980) half of all respondents agreed that “in the next year or two” ten-
sions between foreign workers and Germany would escalate (Noelle-Neumann
1981, 494). A second (1986) revealed that although most Germans (61 percent)
recognized the economy needed foreign workers, a supermajority (70 percent) never -
theless advocated that their numbers be reduced (Hoskin 1991, 72).         
If anything, the aversion to early post-WWII immigration was greater among
the French public. Half of all respondents surveyed in 1947 (Watson 1952, 20)
objected to the presence of Spanish, North African, and Italian immigrants in
France, and a near majority (47 percent) opposed the “idea” of immigration (Mauco
1950, 21). Four years later only half of all French respondents judged that settled
foreigners were “rendering services to the country” (Girard 1971, 834). Against this
backdrop of negativity toward mass immigration, a majority of the French public
in 1947, 1949, and 1965 —that is, at the very height of foreign worker contribu-
tions to the postwar French economy— opposed allowing a “certain number” of
foreigners to enter and settle in France (Girard 1971, 861).  
The French public’s apprehension about immigration and immigrants was fueled
by a fear that foreigners, particularly North Africans, black Africans, and Turks,
would not assimilate into French society. In a 1971 opinion survey, for example,
only 56 percent of respondents considered that foreigners in France would grad-
ually become French, while 35 percent expressed the belief that they would always
be different (Girard 1971, 840). Moreover, despite the fact that in 1971 less than
a quarter of respondents (23 percent) indicated that their particular neighborhood
was directly affected by immigrant settlement (Girard et al. 1974, 1021), a near-
majority (49 percent) agreed that the then-existing ratio of one foreigner for every
13 French people was “too high” (Girard et al. 1974, 1022). 
In comparison to the British and French, the reaction of the Spanish public
to mass migration to Spain during its take-off phase in the early 1990s was relaxed
and their reception of immigrants relatively tolerant. In contrast to most other
Europeans during this period, only a minority (25 percent) of Spaniards during this
period believed there were “too many” immigrants in their country (European
 Commission 1991, A35). Indeed, immigration barely registered on the Spanish
public’s issue agenda through the late 1990s; moreover, even at the start of the
current decade less than 10 percent of the public identified immigration as one of
Spain’s three major problems (Table 4).  
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Nevertheless, against this generally positive backdrop were several worrying
signs. First, beginning in 1992 and continuing throughout the decade, a majority
of Spaniards thought that the entry of immigrants from the less developed coun-
tries should be restricted (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001, 159). Second,
in 2000 a supermajority of Spaniards (83 percent) endorsed the view that there
were either “too many” or “many” persons of other nationalities residing in the
country (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001, 121). Third, most Spaniards felt
that immigration levels would only increase: almost 80 percent predicted that the
number of foreign immigrants would rise within five years (Centro de Inves tiga -
ciones Sociológicas 1999), a higher percentage than those foreseeing an increase
in the overall consumption of alcohol (55 percent) and illegal drugs (50 percent),
and nearly the same percentage of respondents as those who anticipated a rise in
the number of couples living together outside of marriage (81 percent). Finally, in
1996 and 2000 more survey respondents than not felt that migrants were being
received with “contempt,” “aggressiveness,” “distrust,” and “indifference,” rather
than with “friendliness” (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 1996-2008). 
PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11
Although public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants fluctuated some-
what in response to changing economic, social, and political conditions during the
late 1980s and into the 1990s (Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Kessler and Freeman
2005), they nevertheless remained mostly negative (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup
2008). A large plurality of Europeans (46 percent) in 1988 endorsed the view that
the presence of non-European Community citizens in their country was a “bad thing,”
including either a plurality or majority of citizens in three of the six major Euro pean
immigration destination countries: Belgium, Denmark, and Germany (European Com -
mission 1988, 64). In France, a majority of respondents (58 percent) in 1984 concurred
with the statement that the proportion of immigrants in the population was too
large and an equal number (57 percent) in 1989 were “personally concerned” about
immigration (Lynch and Simon 2003, 164). In the Netherlands, a plurality (45 per -
cent) of persons surveyed in 1986 endorsed the prescription that all legal immi-
grants should be encouraged to repatriate (Moors, Van Dam, and Esveldt 1999). In
Italy, a plurality of respondents in 1987 (49 percent) and 1989 (43 percent) perceived
either “only” or “mainly” disadvantages to immigration; moreover, a majority (57/51 per-
cent) wanted immigration to be restricted (Bonifazi 1992, 32-33). 
With some exceptions, European public attitudes about immigrants and immi -
gration did not improve much during the 1990s (Semyonov and Raijman 2006).
As previously, a large majority (74 percent) of Britons perceived the future United
Kingdom either as a “multi-racial society with tensions” or one where “groups live
separately but in tension,” although in contrast to the 1959-1972 period, only a
minority (27 percent) of the public perceived that British race relations were “get-
ting worse” (Hastings and Hastings 1998, 463-464). In France, when asked to
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choose between either “integrating” immigrants or having them “depart,” a major-
ity of respondents chose the latter option in three surveys between 1990 and 1992
(TNS Sofres 2002). A majority of the French also endorsed offering “working
immigrants” financial incentives to return to their respective countries of origin
(Lynch and Simon 2003, 166). In the Netherlands, the 45 percent of respondents
advocating that all immigrants be repatriated in 1986 swelled to 48 percent in
1990 and 51 percent in 1994 (Moors, Van Dam, and Esveldt 1999). By 1998,
even larger majorities disagreed that “Muslims have a lot to offer Dutch culture”
(55 percent) while concurring that Western European and Muslim “ways of life
are irreconcilable” (53 percent) (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, 23). In Ger -
many in 1991, a majority of respondents endorsed the statement that most politi-
cians worry “too much” about foreigners and “not enough about Germans” (Legge,
Jr. 1996, 520). In Italy, a robust majority (63 percent) agreed with the statement
that foreigners who had lived in Italy “for quite some time should eventually return to
their own country” (Bonifazi 1992, 32). 
During the 1990s, Europeans as a whole continued to hold the opinion that
there were “too many immigrants” in their country, although the percentage of res -
pondents endorsing this view either declined or stayed constant in 8 out of 13
countries surveyed in both 1991 and 1997 (Table 1). Interestingly, Britain, France, and
Spain were among the countries where the percentages declined. Un doubtedly
fueling the public’s aversion to immigrant numbers during the decade was its un -
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TABLE 1
VIEW THAT THERE ARE “TOO MANY” IMMIGRANTS, 1988-2000 (%)
Country 1988 1991 1992 1993 1994 1997 2000
Austria — — — — — 49.6 30.5
Belgium 42.9 56.6 53.0 53.7 57.1 59.5 54.5
Denmark 35.5 42.7 45.9 42.8 40.5 46.1 33.8
Finland — — — — — 10.4 17.3
France         44.6 55.8 51.5 55.6 55.1 46.1 42.0
Germany 48.1 54.9 55.0 59.5 40.1 51.8 43.2
Greece 19.1 28.6 45.1 57.4 63.9 71.0 58.3
Ireland 7.3 12.1 11.3 7.9 8.0 19.0 33.3
Italy 33.7 63.0 65.0 64.3 45.9 52.6 42.6
Luxembourg 30.0 20.3 32.1 20.6 23.0 32.8 23.3
Netherlands 30.0 44.1 48.7 47.3 47.2 39.6 41.3
Portugal 13.9 18.2 27.6 25.1 30.2 28.1 30.9
Spain 17.4 24.6 23.4 25.2 26.5 20.4 22.6
Sweden — — — — — 37.8 27.6
UK 44.5 54.1 50.1 50.2 42.4 42.3 44.1
EC/EU 37.4 50.5 50.0 51.6 43.5 44.5 39.9
SOURCE: Kessler and Freeman (2005, 831).
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easiness about the presence within their society of large numbers of persons of color
and, increasingly, different religious traditions. As reflected in Table 2, a substan-
tial percentage of Europeans continued to find the “presence of people of another
race disturbing” during the 1990s, an especially pervasive sentiment among Belgians,
Danes, and the French. Given this, it is not surprising that a fifth of European
Union citizens in 2000 endorsed the view that “foreigners should be sent back to
their country of origin” (Thalhammer et al. 2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Public Opinion after September 11
Did the events associated with September 11 transform public attitudes toward
immigration and immigrants? Did public opinion become more negative? As might
have been expected, European opinions about immigration and immigrants did
not improve after September 11 (Pew Research Center 2007, 28). Nevertheless, as
we will see below, it was not significantly transformed by the trauma of September 11;
nor did it radically change in Britain, France, and Spain as a consequence of these
countries’ respective domestic tragedies (Fetzer and Soper 2003, 256). Although
immigration-related issues became more salient after September 11, public attitudes
largely continued along the trajectories established years and, in some cases, de c -
ades earlier.   
TABLE 2
AGREE THAT THE “PRESENCE OF PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RACE
[IS] DISTURBING,” 1993-2000 (%)
% Foreign-
EB 39 EB 48 EB 53 Average Average Born Pop. Rank
Country 1993 1997 2000 Percent Rank 2000 Foreign Pop.
Belgium 21.6 22.3 26.7 23.5 1 8.4 3
Denmark 19.3 24 23.1 22.1 2 4.8 6
France 23.4 13.0 23.1 19.8 3 5.6 4
Austria — 22.2 13.8 18.0 4 9.3 1
Germany 15.2 13.7 16.8 15.2 5 8.9 2
Italy 12.8 13.9 14.2 13.6 6 2.4 10
Britain 13.6 12.0 13.5 13.0 7 4.0 8
Ireland 8.6 8.6 19 12.1 8 3.3 9
Sweden — 8.8 11.7 10.3 9 5.4 5
Netherlands 7.9 11.8 9.7 9.8 10 4.2 7
Finland 11.0 7.2 10.2 9.5 11 1.8 13
Portugal 8.3 5.4 11.5 8.4 12 2.1 12
Spain 10.7 6.4 5.6 7.6 13 2.2 11
Correlation between average rank and percent foreign rank = 0.75
SOURCE: European Commission (1993, 1998, and 2000).
More Salient?
Although it is reasonable to presume that European publics would perceive immi-
gration as more salient after September 11, according to at least one yardstick, this
does not seem to be so universally. As Table 3 demonstrates, the percentage of res -
pondents identifying immigration as a priority for either European or national public
policy actually declined in more EU countries than it increased between 2000 and
2003. Immigration also failed to become more salient in 6 of 15 member-state coun -
tries and in the EU as a whole between 1997 and 2003, a pattern which largely con -
tinues through to the present. Indeed, only 32 percent of EU citizens in 2008 expressed
the view that immigration should be made a priority during the 2009 European elec -
tion campaign, thus firmly esta blishing it as a second-order issue compared with
unemployment (47 percent), economic growth (45 percent), inflation (41 percent),
and crime (37 percent) (European Commission 2008b, 30).     
As might have been expected, immigration increased in salience among Britons
and Spaniards between 2000 and 2006, a period which conveniently brackets opinion
prior to September 11 and after the 2004 train bombings in Spain and the July 2005
terrorist events in Britain. However, inexplicably, its salience declined in France:
indeed, by 2004, the salience of immigration for French citizens (8 percent) was among
the lowest within the EU and only half the EU average. More over, after increasing as
a driver of vote choice in French national elections between 1984 and 1997, the immi -
gration issue diminished in importance in 2002 and 2004 (Schain 2008b, 127).
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TABLE 3
SALIENCE OF IMMIGRATION AS A POLICY ISSUE AMONG EUROPEANS, 
1997-2008 (%)
Trend Trend Trend 
Country 1997 2000 2003 2000-2003 2004 2006 2008 2004-2008 1997-2008
Austria 23 17 10 - 10 17 14 + -
Belgium 11 14 16 + 18 16 17 - +
Britain 18 20 32 + 41 32 35 - +
Denmark 15 13 25 + 23 27 18 - +
Finland 5 9 5 - 5 5 7 + +
France 15 13 11 - 8 11 7 - -
Germany 25 22 5 - 8 8 6 - -
Greece 2 16 6 - 6 3 4 - +
Ireland 6 9 10 + 12 11 5 - -
Italy 12 17 13 - 12 15 7 - -
Luxembourg 8 10 10 N 17 12 10 - +
Netherlands 8 16 8 - 16 16 18 + +
Portugal 2 3 2 - 2 3 2 N N
Spain 4 6 17 + 20 33 18 - +
Sweden 5 6 10 + 11 7 12 + +
EU 15 15 16 13 - 16 17 (11) - -
SOURCE: European Commission (1998, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2008a).
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The extent to which immigration-related issues became more salient in Britain
after September 11 is clear in the data represented in Chart 1. As it indicates, immi -
gration-related issues generally fell below the threshold of greatest import during
the 1980s and 1990s; only in 2001 did they consistently rank among the most im por -
tant. Since 2001, however, their salience has soared, increasing more than twofold.
Indeed, 30 percent or more of respondents viewed them as among the most salient
in 37 different monthly surveys between September 2001 and December 2007.
By contrast, before September 2001, immigration failed to achieve this threshold
of salience in any month during the previous 27 years (Ipsos MORI 1974-2009).                
On the surface, the trajectory of Spanish public opinion was somewhat sim-
ilar to the British. As we observed earlier, until this decade immigration barely reg-
istered on the Spanish public’s issue agenda; less than 10 percent of the public
identified it as one of Spain’s three major problems (Table 4). After the March 11,
2004, bombings, however, the number of Spanish respondents identifying immi-
gration as a major problem rose to 28 percent.
This said, three facts lend perspective to the state of contemporary Spanish
public opinion on immigration. First, by 2007 public concern had fallen back to
what it had been at the beginning of the decade (that is, before rising again in
2008). Second, although a large minority of the Spanish public perceived immi-
gration as a “problem” for their country, many fewer saw it as a problem for them
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“personally.” Finally, at no point either before or after September 11 did the salience
of immigration for the Spanish public ascend to the heights recorded in post-
September 11 Britain.
More Illiberal?
Because immigration is a multi-faceted phenomenon and problems of immigration
control and immigrant incorporation are often conflated in public, political discourse,
any longitudinal analysis of the trajectory of public opinion must be approached
cautiously. However, because we are less concerned in this essay with measuring
social tolerance or prejudice toward established immigrants (Coenders and Scheepers
2008) than we are with the question of whether or not public opinion has become
more securitized, the aforementioned problem is somewhat less severe. 
Did the events of September 11 alter the center of gravity of public opinion?
Are Europeans less tolerant of immigration and immigrants post-9/ 11? In Britain
the opinion survey evidence suggests not. As the data in Table 5 reveals, the res -
ponse of Britons to the question of whether not there are “too many immigrants” has
remained relatively constant over recent years: robust majorities agreed with this
statement both before and after September 11; indeed, the distribution of respon -
ses to one survey in 2007 was strikingly similar to what it was both in 1989 and
2000. A different longitudinal opinion survey (Simon and Sikich 2007, 957), which
posed the question of whether immigration should be reduced, increased, or remain
the same, also discovered that the British public’s views were fairly constant pre-
and post-September 11 (in 1995 and 2003, respectively). Indeed, compared to the
1960s, when more than four in five persons felt that too many immigrants had
been admitted into Britain (Messina 1989, 12), contemporary British public atti-
tudes toward immigration in the post-September 11 period seem positively relaxed
and tolerant.
Evidence of greater continuity than discontinuity in British opinion after July
2005, Britain’s September 11 moment, is contained in Table 6. When asked to
choose among five statements about immigration policy, large majorities pre-
dictably preferred the option of making immigration laws “tougher.” Yet, the size
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TABLE 4
MIGRATION TO SPAIN: ONE OF THREE MAJOR PROBLEMS, 1998-2008 (%)
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
For Spain 2.5 9.9 9.3 12.0 13.9 17.8 28.0 17.3 10.1 23.7
Personally 2.4 3.4 3.6 4.9 5.1 7.7 8.1 12.2 8.7 7.9
SOURCE: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1996-2008).
of this majority varied little over time and was actually slightly smaller in 2003
than it was in 2006 and 2007. Fairly constant, too, were the percentage of respon-
dents advocating that “immigration should be stopped altogether.” Somewhat sur-
prisingly given the negative environment for immigration purportedly generated
by terrorism, this minority opinion never exceeded more than 13 percent between
2003 and 2007.                    
As Table 7 reveals, more focused public attitudes on immigration from the
Middle East and North Africa did not significantly change in the wake of the
2005 London bombings either. Although the percentage of respondents affirming
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TABLE 5
“THERE ARE TOO MANY IMMIGRANTS” IN BRITAIN, 1989-2007 (%)
Total Agree Total Disagree Neither/Nor* Don’t Know
1989 63 18 18 1
1994 64 33 — 3
1997 61 35 — 4
1999 55 33 — 13
2000 66 17 13 3
2001 54 31 10 5
2007 68 22 8 2
* 1994-1999 data from surveys using self-completed questionnaires with no “neither/ nor” option and,
except in 1999, no “don’t know” option. 
SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (2007a).
TABLE 6
BRITISH ATTITUDES ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, 2003-2007 (%)
Change
2003 2005 2006 2007 2003-2007
Laws on immigration should:
Be abolished, so anyone can come 2 2 1 2 0
live in Britain.
Be relaxed. 4 8 5 5 +1
Remain as they are. 12 19 17 13 +1
Be much tougher. 67 58 63 64 -3
Immigration should be 
stopped altogether: 13 11 12 12 -1
Don’t know 3 2 2 3 0
SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (2007b).
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immigration from the aforementioned region as a “good thing” declined between
2005 and 2007, a majority of the British public nevertheless remained positive. More -
over, the minority concluding that Middle Eastern and North African immigration
was a “bad thing” actually decreased between 2002 and 2007.   
Although attitudes toward settled immigrants have shifted somewhat in France
since the 1990s, similarly to Britain, they have not done so in the expected, illiberal
direction. As Table 8 indicates, the percentage of French respondents preferring
immigrants “to depart” decreased in the interval prior to and after the 1995 bomb-
ings (1992-1998) and again between 1998 and 2002. Indeed, fewer respondents
preferred that settled immigrants leave France in 2002 (38 percent) than in 1998
(47 percent). On the other side of the coin, the percentage of the public preferring
that immigrants “integrate” into French society increased between 1992 and 1998
(41 to 47 percent) and again between 1998 and 2002 (47 to 53 percent).
These results do not, of course, suggest a liberal turn in public attitudes. The
more recent majority advocating the integration of immigrants into French society
says nothing about the motivations underlying that preference or the preferred means
by which immigrants should integrate (e.g., through forced assimilation or volun-
tary incorporation). This said, the fact that many more respondents chose the option
of immigrant integration over repatriation in 2002 dispels the notion that the ter-
rorist events of either 1995 or 2001 caused French public opinion to become espe -
cially illiberal. Indeed, it is particulary revealing that the public opinion majorities
favoring repatriating immigrants (1991 and 1992) were recorded before and not after
the domestic terrorist bombings in 1995.
French attitudes toward immigration from the Middle East as well as North
Africa have not become more illiberal as a consequence of September 11. Indeed,
if anything, the French public became more tolerant of immigration from the region
over time. As Table 7 indicates, the majority perceiving this particular immi gra -
tion stream to be a “bad thing” in 2002 became an equivalent majority endorsing
TABLE 8
FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLED IMMIGRANTS, 1989-2002 
Wish for Immigrants to: 
Year Depart (%) Integrate (%)
1989 46 48
1990 46 42
1991 51 40
1992 52 41
1998 47 47
2002 38 53
SOURCE: TNS Sofres (2002).
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it as a “good thing” in 2007. This result generally echoes the findings of a 2007 opin-
ion survey (PRNewswire 2007) in which a majority of the French public (54 percent)
con curred with the suggestion that immigration “helps” the country, a sentiment
also shared by either a plurality or majority of Italians (51 percent), Germans (48
percent), and Spaniards (53 percent).   
In contrast to the public in Britain and France, Spaniards have become more
negative toward Middle Eastern and North African immigration (Table 7), albeit
over a shorter interval. From two-thirds who concurred that immigration from the
region was a “good thing” in 2005, popular feeling deteriorated to the point that a
plurality (45 percent) viewed it as a bad thing in 2007. This said, the erosion of
Spanish public support for Middle Eastern and North African immigration is not
likely to be a direct reaction to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, since the latter
postdated the former result by three years. Moreover, as Table 7 demonstrates, even
in 2007 Spaniards were far less negative about immigration from the Middle East
and North Africa than either Germans or Italians, neither of whom has yet directly
experienced a September 11 moment.
Discussion
What can be concluded about this public opinion survey evidence? First, although
immigration-related issues have become more politically salient in some countries
since September 11 across most of Western Europe, including in France and Spain,
they are and have been historically second-order concerns: that is, they fall below
the threshold of political significance routinely exceeded by economic and other
issues. After increasing as a motive for vote choice in French elections between 1984
and 1997, for example, immigration declined in importance in 2002 and 2004.
Moreover, immigration-related issues played only a negligible role in the 2005 British
general election (Economist 2005). 
Second, there has generally been greater continuity than discontinuity in pu b -
 lic opinion on immigration-related issues. Put simply, European publics have always
been wary of mass immigration and immigrant settlement. The post-1995 incidents
of domestic terrorism as well as the U.S. experience of September 11 do not seem
to have influenced European public opinion to become more illiberal toward new
immigration or immigrants. This counterintuitive conclusion holds true even with
regard to Middle Eastern and North African migration.
How can these counterintuitive results be explained? Yankelovich (1993) argues
that “public opinion develops slowly over a long period —at least 10 years for a
complex issue.” In doing so, he claims that it winds through seven stages, the last
of which results in citizens endorsing a course of action, accepting its costs and
trade-offs, and living with the consequences. Immigration, it could be reasonably
assumed, is just such a complex and multifaceted issue. If so, September 11 prob-
ably had relatively little impact on the trajectory of public opinion because the most
disruptive and disturbing effects of mass immigration had long ago been factored
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into most Europeans’ thinking, particularly among publics within the traditional
immigration-receiving countries. Indeed, McLaren has astutely observed that po p -
ular “fears related to the religion and culture of new immigrants were apparent in
Europe before the attacks of September 11, July 7, and the Madrid train attack
of 2004” (2008, 15). 
Evidence supporting this hypothesis is presented in Tables 9 and 10. As the data
demonstrate, not only were immigrants perceived negatively by many Europeans
before 2001, but the former were already established as objects of general inse-
curity (Table 10) and viewed by a substantial minority of Europeans as specifically
threatening to national culture/identity, employment, and public safety (Table 10).
In short, issues pertaining to mass immigrant settlement were already “securitized” for
many Europeans before September 11.
Much like the evidence reported in previous tables, the data in Table 9 reveal
that whatever the level of public concern about immigrants prior to 2001, the tra-
jectory of opinion did not significantly change after September 11. Indeed, of the
five Western European countries represented, only in Spain did public perceptions of
immigrants as threatening along all three security dimensions significantly spike
upward from 1999 to 2005; in France and Italy it receded.
In light of the aforementioned results, public opinion does not seem to be
more securitized after September 11 than before. As a consequence, and all else
being equal, the historically expansive bias of state immigration and immigrant
policy is likely to continue as long as political elites in Europe view immigration to
be in their country’s best interest (Messina 2007, 224-245).
TABLE 10
MINORITY GROUPS AS A CAUSE OF INSECURITY, 2000 (%)
Country Tend to Agree Tend to Disagree Don’t Know
Greece 77 19 3
Denmark 60 33 7
Belgium 56 35 9
France 51 41 8
Germany 46 34 19
Norway (2002) 45 41 14
Netherlands 45 44 11
Austria 44 39 17
Ireland 42 43 14
EU 42 47 15
Luxembourg 40 47 13
Italy 38 46 16
Spain 34 56 11
United Kingdom 32 48 20
Finland 32 61 8
Sweden 24 66 10
SOURCE: Statistics Norway (2002).  
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